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Complex Relationships: The State, Privateers, & Organized 
Crime 
 
by Rhonda Longard 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to examine the history and nature of privateers during the 17th 
through the 19th centuries with the aim in answering this question: Using contemporary 
definitions, can the business of privateering can be categorized as organized crime? Privateering 
has long been considered, not only a legal course of reprisal for wartime losses, but also a heroic 
action that was celebrated, at least on the side of the privateer. The reality is more complex. In 
order to explain why privateers were employed despite the harm they perpetrated throughout the 
Maritimes during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, this paper incorporates a blend of 
sociology, criminology, Atlantic Canadian history, and political economy to show the connection 
between privateering and organized crime. It draws on a combination of sources to gather data on 
the complex history and nature of privateering. It also applies a combination of definitions to show 
that this class of mercenary/merchant marine were not only necessary in establishing the interests 
of foreign powers in Canada, but were also instrumental in the foundation and development of the 
early government in the Maritimes; shaping the course Canada would rise to or take in the coming 
two centuries. Finally, Stephen Schneider’s 23-point comprehensive taxonomy of the 
characteristics of an organized crime conspiracy is applied, along with the historical and 
contemporary evidence to point to a classification of privateering as organized crime. 
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Introduction 
What Constitutes OC & Issues Surrounding an Exact Definition 
This research began with a simple question: Can privateers be considered organized criminals 
and can privateering be considered organized crime? Researching the history of privateering in a 
linear and straightforward manner does not translate into telling their story in a linear and 
straightforward manner. This is because there are additional factors that complicate the issue. A 
major question being, if privateering was legal, and even celebrated, then why did its practice 
decline before being abolished in the 19th century? This paper seeks an answer to that question. 
First, in order to classify if the privateer is an organized criminal, and further, if that station is 
considered organized crime, then the conditions and reasoning behind why it did not evolve 
along with modern world markets and the nation-states that would have eventually employed 
them, needed to be known, as two great world wars were fought not long after privateering was 
abolished. One could argue that global economic growth and the co-operation needed to regulate 
it forced nations to abandon the practice, and that makes sense, but there are two other reasons 
that fit. One, France lost their hold in the Americas (Vachon, 1985, p. 130). Imperialist ambitions 
stopped cold on the Plains of Abraham (Vachon, 1985, p. 135), and this may have contributed to 
declined need for Privateers. Two, Britain began seriously colonizing and fortifying North 
America, which led to them being dominant in shipping which would have further lessened the 
need for Privateers. With a permanent base in North America merchants could concentrate on 
growing a domestic economy that complimented Britain instead of merely feeding into it 
(Vachon, 1985, p. 169). These ideas have served as the background for this research as a major 
consideration is the need to know why, if privateering was not only legal, in the barest sense of 
the term, but also morally justifiable, was the practice abolished at all? This is especially 
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concerning as, during the early years of colonization, many wars between European powers over 
land and resources in Canada (New France), and other wars all provided a theatre of battle for 
the privateer, whose profession depended, and thrived upon conflict.  
Research Limitations & Defining the Role of Privateer 
One of the main problems with conducting this type of research is the complicated and changing 
nature of the role of the privateer. From the buccaneers to the well-regulated privateers during 
the War of 1812, the privateer maintained certain characteristics. In all time periods he was a 
private citizen, usually a merchant, who was sanctioned under a Letter of Marque to sail with the 
express intention of recouping economic wartime losses from an enemy of the state (Conlin, 
1998, p. 79). The privateer’s role changed in relation to the monarchy’s imperialist ambition, and 
colonialist ambition. It was also affected by the changing economy in wartime, and societal 
factors. Another danger comes in looking back through the lens of our vastly different political 
system, of being aware that historical retrospect, when looking that far back into the past, can 
cloud judgement. Knowing this enhances the need to contextualize that time and culture, even if 
they may not be fully understood.  
In addition, it is important to also be mindful of how abstract concepts like crime and 
harm fit the definition of privateer, and how the possibility of a connection to state crime also 
affected classification of the privateer’s role as legitimate, or not.   
Definitions of OC 
Organized crime is a term that nearly everyone has heard of but is difficult to 
conceptualize. There are as many definitions of organized crime as there are organizations 
studying it. Some of them compete with one another, and some of them even contradict one 
another (Schneider, 2017, p. 46). Why? Part of the reason is that there is no all-encompassing 
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definition of organized crime, and also part of the reason is that no universally agreed upon set of 
characteristics exist that will accurately describe this phenomenon (Schneider, 2017, p. 34). This 
again is broken down into segments. One, the concept of organized crime is complex and 
amorphous, constantly changing from place to place, culture to culture, and circumstance to 
circumstance, or what we call: a social construct. Two, it escapes a comprehensive description 
because the very description itself becomes a tool of the one who conceives it, and that definition 
can then become the backbone of policy and law enacted to fight against it. Added to this is the 
fact that there is very little agreement regarding what constitutes “organized”. Whether we define 
it in terms of crimes, the criminals, or a precise set of characteristics, one thing is certain: OCG is 
amorphous, constantly changing and adapting to their own particular set of life experiences or 
challenges. The Chicago City Council Committee on Crime observed this in their 1915 report. 
“While this criminal group is not by any means completely organized it has many of the 
characteristics of a system. It has its own language it has its own laws; its own history; its 
traditional customs” (Maltz, 1976. P. 344). There is evidence that privateers too, had their own 
unique systems and traditions (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8).  
The Problem in Applying OC to an Historical Category 
The privateer’s moment in history has been well documented, however, the shifting sands of 
time and changing society, especially during imperialist period, and later the colonization of the 
Americas blended to form a grey area that makes applying the term organized crime to their role 
problematic. Can it be classified as legalized criminal behaviour, or a set of criminal 
organizations under different flags? Privateering or “maritime violence, (also) called ‘piracy’ by 
its victims” (Jowitt, 2010, as cited in: Andrews, 1984, p. 116-128) placed the definition of its 
legality as a matter of perspective. 
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Another problem in classifying a modern term using an historical category is the 
complicated nature of the role of the privateer, which makes the study of it from a traditional 
Criminological standpoint problematic. The complicated nature is due in part to the time period 
during which he lived. It was his lived reality, and the factors that made up that reality, such as 
who he was in relation to the monarchy, his victims, the market, and the rest of society are all 
foreign to our understanding, and thus applying a modern construct creates a barrier that is 
difficult, but not insurmountable, to cross.  
How the Definitions of OC Can be Applied to Privateering 
The violent actions committed by privateers during their commission included abstract concepts 
such as crime and harm, which in turn, hold questions concerning morality. So, here is the crux 
of that moral dilemma: can privateering can be considered organized crime?  
For a time, especially during the Middle Ages, even piracy was not considered strictly 
criminal, and as time went on, nor was privateering (Jowitt, 2010, p. 96). Though both included 
activities that would normally not be permitted upon one’s own shores, the only distinction here 
was that it was legitimate only in the eyes of the one who commissioned them. To all others it 
was still considered piracy, especially his victims. Further complicating the matter was the fact 
that a privateer would turn pirate for a time, and then back to privateer, as circumstance and 
direction provided, especially during the buccaneering period (Conlin, 2009b, p. 9). Classifying 
their actions then becomes much more complicated. It is for these reasons that it is possible to 
apply definitions and characteristics of organized crime to privateering. The harmful actions 
committed by privateers were deliberately set apart from those activities carried out by the Navy 
in wartime, though they were exactly the same type of activities (Conlin, 2009b, p. 19), therefore 
privateering actions can be classified as an acts of war! Actions such as press-ganging (Conlin, 
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1998, p. 88), brutal treatment of prisoners, robbing, and the wanton destruction of ships and 
cargo (Conlin, 1998, p. 19) are all included in this assessment. 
Research Methods 
Research for this thesis entailed a literature review using both primary and secondary sources to 
examine the history and nature of Privateers during the 17th through the 19th centuries and to 
determine if the business of Privateering can be categorized as organized crime using 
contemporary definitions?  
Secondary sources included books and articles examining privateers, maritime history, 
organized crime, and economic history. Primary sources included historical news media articles 
and government documents, many of which were retrieved from the Nova Scotia Archives.  
This thesis begins by describing the different ways of classifying organized crime using 
the Canadian and United Nations definitions as well as a taxonomy of characteristics developed 
by the European Union. These definitions and taxonomy are then applied to privateering. Next, 
the characteristics found in Stephen Schneider’s 23-point taxonomy of organized crime are 
applied to privateers in order to ascertain if they can be categorized under the umbrella term of 
organized crime. 
Background 
This section will cover how the role of the privateer was used by monarchs as a private navy that 
fought a subversive economic war against enemy merchant ships. It will cover their influence in 
the Americas, and how during the imperialist period and the early years of colonization the lack 
of a permanent government created a vacuum filled by the privateer – that larger than life figure 
who inhabited the grey area between pirate and naval officer. 
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Definition of Piracy 
The definition of piracy is the unprovoked, predatory attack upon sea going merchant vessels 
perpetrated by using intimidation and violence with the intent in stealing the targeted ship’s 
cargo, or both the ship and the cargo. According to Dan Conlin, pirates are “stateless” criminals 
and outlaws; the “enemies of all mankind” who prey on any nation’s ships in peace or in war” 
(2009a, p. 82), and whom also form a “unique rebel culture” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 54) of their own.  
Definition of Privateering 
The definition of privateering is the unprovoked, predatory attack in wartime upon sea going 
merchant vessels perpetrated by using intimidation and (sometimes) violence with the intent in 
stealing the targeted ship’s cargo, or both the ship and the cargo. It was state regulated and 
sanctioned with a Letter of Marque granted to the privateer and any prizes recovered subject to 
approval by the court of Vice-Admiralty, the same court who regulated the navy.  
  According to Dan Conlin, different countries or kingdoms used privateering as “a critical 
form of warfare from the middle ages until it was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 
(2009b, p. 20). However, before the 18th century privateers were poorly regulated, with the lines 
of between them and piracy were blurred, leading many to question their legality (Neufeld, 2011, 
p. 6-7). This changed during the years of the Golden Age when, after the 1603 death of Queen 
Elizabeth I. Piracy numbers exploded soon after James I took the throne, made peace with Spain, 
and then cancelled all Letters of Marque the queen issued (Vachon, 1985, p. 53). This forced 
governments to update regulations so that they marked “a clear distinction in law and in practice 
between piracy and privateering” (Conlin, 2009a, p. 82). Over time, even that was not enough to 
sustain their trade. The 1856 Declaration of Paris marked the end of privateering and 
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permanently ended the debate regarding legality, forcing all private warships to internationally 
be regarded as pirates (Conlin, 2009b, p. 20).  
 Piracy Origin & History to King Henry VII 
“Piracy is an ancient crime of the sea, even as old as seafaring itself” (Conlin, 2019). The first 
written accounts of piracy came from Egyptian sources where hieroglyphs told of the “Sea 
peoples” who raided their coastal towns (Conlin, 2009b, p. 7). The Roman recounted acts of piracy, 
with Cicero calling them “hostis humani generis” or “enemies of the human race” (Jowitt, 2010, 
p. 84). One of the more famous incidents of ancient piracy was when a young Julius Caesar was 
captured by pirates. They eventually spared his life, and instead of receiving their ransom, they 
were crucified (Conlin, 2009b, p. 7) History is replete with the stories of so many others turning 
to piracy, such as the Irish, Basque, Saxon, and Viking, Maltese Christians, and Arab pirates, also 
known as “Barbary Pirates” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 7). 
Throughout the Middle Ages piracy was tolerated, and while not criminally sanctioned 
(Kert, 1997, p. 34) it was not regulated either because it was used as a means of subversive 
economic warfare against one’s enemies (Kert, 1997, p. 35), much like privateering was in later 
periods.  
It was not until after 1536 that King Henry VIII outlawed piracy with the Offences at Sea 
Act that (Neufeld, 2011, p. 1-2) which made piracy a crime enforceable by criminal law, as opposed 
to civil law, whose use before that time only sought redress (Kert, 1997, p. 35). This act formally 
defined piracy as “All Treasons, Felonies, Robberies, Murthers, and Confederacies…committed 
in or upon the Sea…” (Neufeld, 2011, as cited in Tanner, 1922, p. 347-348). 
The complicated relationship between English monarchs and their privateers (and pirates) 
is difficult, if not impossible to untangle. There can be no telling of the history of one without the 
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others. It is for that reason that the next section will detail the history of piracy and privateering 
together until the beginning of the 18th century, when the distinction between them was clear 
enough to separate them into two categories. 
Piracy & Early Privateering to the Late 1600s: The Era of the Buccaneer 
The late to end of the Middle Ages saw European colonization being led by Portugal and Spain. 
These two world powers divided up the Americas between them in a 1494 treaty called the 
Treaty of Tordesillas (Conlin, 2019) that created a line in the east for Portugal, including Brazil, 
and everything west for Spain, including most of North and South America (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8). 
“No peace beyond the line” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8) was a saying by English, French, and Dutch 
who, once you crossed the Tordesillas Line, declared that it was war against Spain, regardless of 
any peace in Europe (Conlin, 2019).  
Spain created a vast empire in the Americas, at a price paid by others. It was theirs 
through “brutal conquest and enslavement: vast plantations and the world’s biggest gold & silver 
mines” (Conlin, 2019). It was also Spain who “de facto” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8) created a world 
currency that was sustained for the next 300 years (Conlin, 2019). The silver 8 reale coin was its 
base, and the inspiration for the phrase “Pieces of Eight” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8) which was made 
popular by pirate usage and Robert Louis Stevenson, the author who wrote Treasure Island 
(Conlin, 2019).  
As Queen Elizabeth took the throne in 1558, her need for peace ran deep as her main 
concern “throughout her reign was simply to preserve the safety of her kingdom” (Andrews, 
1964, p. 6). This view was prudent and wise, for Spain and France were the superpowers of the 
day, and not England. She was also, according to Andrews, in possession of “an intuitive grasp 
of politics, and that tendency to prevarication which was the despair of her ministers was 
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fundamentally rational (Andrews, 1964, p. 6-7. It was this rationality which prompted her to 
wage a “private anti-Spanish enterprise at sea” (Andrews, 1964, p. 6) thus Queen Elizabeth’s 
need for an inexpensive but effective way to curtail Spanish economic dominance over the 
Americas was privateering; a great system for attacking the wealth of the enemy with little or no 
effort or risk of her own.  
What is a privateer and what was his role? How did it differ from that of a pirate? Pirates 
and Privateers are two terms for what was essentially the same job: to apprehend an enemy ship 
and loot its cargo. “Schneider explains that privateers “were pirates who were issued licences 
(called ‘Letters of Marque’) by the sovereign or government of their country that empowered 
them to rob merchant ships belonging to enemy countries in times of war” (Schneider, 2017, p. 
9).   
The main difference between the two roles was an item of legitimacy, the Letter of 
Marque, although Horwood points out that “the distinction should have been simple, [but] it 
wasn’t always so, and it was sometimes a question of what you could get away with” (2011, p. 
9). Essentially, it came down to who possessed the Letter of Marque, and who did not, although 
of this Conlin says that “they were often traded, falsified, and frequently ignored” (Conlin, 
2009b, p. 9).  
Queen Elizabeth was shrewd, and knew she lacked funds (Andrews, 1964, p. 10), but she 
made up for it by employing a political strategy and war policy that allowed her to use her sea-
power for purely defensive purposes, “to protect English shores, to maintain communications 
and supply lines between the allies, and to deny Spain the use of Western European waters” 
(Andrews, 1964, p. 10).  
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS                                                                                                                                          
13 
 
There was only one problem. Privateers, or Buccaneer’s as they were called at that time, 
tended move fluidly back and forth from privateer to pirate, and what choice would Queen 
Elizabeth have but to turn a “blind eye” (Conlin, 2009a, p. 82) when they would do so? They 
served her purpose by getting the job done without too much expense or effort on her part. As 
Kenneth R. Andrews outlines, “ordinary indiscriminate piracy remained a serious social evil and 
the government’s attempts to suppress it were unavailing. But in times of crisis pirates could be 
useful, provided they concentrated on the right prey” (Jowitt, 2010, as cited in: Andrews, 1964, 
p. 15-16).  
During this period England constantly condemns piracy on one hand, and then turns 
around and uses it, and even celebrating it. In her book, The Culture of Piracy, 1580–1630: 
English Literature and Seaborne Crime, Jowitt explores uses Sir Francis Drake as an example of 
how the word piracy is used “to explore the ways seaborne crime was, in certain circumstances, 
represented as central to the cultural construction of English imperial aspirations” (Jowitt, 2010, 
p. 47). It was his persona that allowed Elizabeth to proclaim his accomplishments while 
condemning the practice. Jowitt further explains that it was this instance, and so many others that 
allowed England to slowly, but surely weaken the Spanish and gain control over the Western 
seas. “Focus on the semantics of the highly-flexible term ‘piracy’ allows us to see the ways 
Drake’s seaborne activities provided an important model for imperial achievement” (Jowitt, 
2010), and what better way to circumvent the need for outright war? Lincoln agrees, writing 
“[p]iracy was not wholly repudiated as a social evil but understood by some to be important to 
the developing national economy” (2011: 72).  
Two examples of privateers who also went pirate were Peter Easton and William Kidd. 
“Certainly, explicitly and officially, piracy was outlawed by Elizabeth I through repeated 
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proclamations against it, yet at times the state’s attitude was far less draconian” (Jowitt, 2010, p. 
96). For Easton, piracy payed off handsomely as he both received his pardon and retired to 
France where he married an heiress (Conlin, 2009b, p. 13-14). For Kidd, however, the timing did 
not work out so well. After raiding Indian and Arab ships not at war with England, he was 
hanged in 1701 (Conlin, 2009, p. 18). 
It was clear that the Buccaneers needed stricter regulations with so many of them 
misbehaving, out of greed mostly. Piracy law was needed, especially when, and in spite of the 
Queen’s relentless quest for maritime dominance that also kept thousands of them in business 
after war with Spain began in 1585 (Neufeld, 2011, p. 4). The rules that were constantly broken 
were simple: target enemy ships in war and stay away from domestic merchants and coasts. The 
Buccaneers did both by targeting coasts too close to home, and by targeting ships that the 
English were not at war with (Neufeld, 2011, p. 5). It became so bad that England was known as 
a “nation of pirates” (Neufeld, 2009, p. 9).  
Before enforcing tighter regulations the definition of piracy needed to be expanded, for 
there needed to be a clear way to distinguish between pirate and privateer. 
Pirates in the Caribbean 
As smaller European Colonizers, such as the English, French, and Dutch struggled to gain 
a foothold in the Americas (Conlin, 2019), piracy became popular in places like the Caribbean. 
Renegade hunters and smugglers on the islands who became pirate and privateers were called 
“boucaniers” or French for “eaters of smoked & roasted meat” (Conlin, 2019). The word was 
Anglicized as “Buccaneers”. After being attacked by the Spanish, the Buccaneers became 
privateers with the encouragement of the English and French, who “were quick to use these 
raiders to weaken the giant Spanish empire” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 8-9). The Buccaneers were 
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usually licensed with a Letter of Marque as privateers, but sometimes turned pirate and attacked 
everyone (Conlin, 2019). These infractions were often overlooked “as long as they were 
successful” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 9), and also for the practical reason that there were no courts to 
enforce them so far from England (Conlin, 2009b). The most famous was Henry Morgan, who 
“epitomized the buccaneering era with his successful, although not always legal, raids on 
Spanish colonies” (Conlin, 2009b). An influential first hand account by his ship doctor, Aleandre 
Oliver Exquemelin, called The Buccaneers of America, was written in 1678 (Conlin, 2019). In it, 
Exquemelin detailed how Letters of Marque were actually viewed by those who used them: 
This we had purchased at a cheap rate, having given for it only the sum of ten ducats, 
or pieces of eight. But the truth of the thing was that at first our commission was 
made only for the space of three months, …whereas among ourselves we had 
contrived to make it last for three years – for with this we were resolved to seek our 
fortunes (Conlin, 2019) 
He also detailed how, aboard his ship, at least, they followed rules detailed in the ship’s Articles 
of Agreement. One of the most striking being “No prey, no pay” (Conlin, 2019, as cited in 
Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 1967). 
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Division Between Piracy & Privateering 
We have seen that the distinction between piracy and privateering “was so fine that a privateer 
might stray into piracy almost by accident” (Horwood, 2011, p. 9), but as time went on, those 
lines that had been so blurry during the years of imperialism and the first years of the 
colonization of the Americas grew clearer and more definitive. Queen Elizabeth I, in times past, 
was able to accommodate, “either through the semi-official nature of the enterprise or the 
retrospective issuing of letters of marque, the men who returned with valuable commodities 
wrested from their victims by acts of extreme violence at sea” (Jowitt, 2010, p. 102). Indeed, she 
handed out more Letters of Marque than anyone; a practice halted by her successor James I who 
“considered privateering immoral, and unsuccessfully tried to stop the practice” (Schulte-
Bockholt, 2006, p. 183). He did this by revoking Queen Elizabeth’s privateer commissions, and 
even laying up those legitimate ships owned by the Admiralty. In response, many frustrated 
privateers turned to piracy (Vachon, 1985, p. 53). 
The battle lines were drawn and there was no backing down. It was clear that in order to 
combat the sudden rise in piracy the answer was to respond with strength and resolve. For James, 
his next actions were justified because it was, again, a matter of context and conscience that 
prevented him from wholeheartedly taking up the practice of privateering. His “personal hatred 
of piracy” (Neufeld, 2011, p. 7), and his policy of peace with Spain, resulted in his decision in 
1619 to behead Sir Walter Raleigh, a favourite of Queen Elizabeth (Horwood, 2011, p. 22) 
because he “took piracy too far” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 14) and needed to be made an example of. 
After the ascension of James I, Sir Henry Mainwaring must have realized how fine the balance 
between favour and treason was and, fearing for his own head, was inspired to write On 
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Beginnings, Practices, and Suppression of Pirates, presenting it to the king after he was 
pardoned in 1616 (Conlin, 2009b, p. 14). 
In his attempt to supress piracy, James soon found out that it was easier in theory than in 
practice as his “efforts were complicated by the Offences at Sea Act of 1536 which failed to 
account for dealing with piracy beyond the immediate vicinity of England (Neufeld, 2011, p.8). 
Further complicating matters was the corruption within the Admiralty Courts, rampant use of 
forged Letters of Marque, and the lack of any international law during this period (Neufeld, 
2011). For half a century England’s attempts to enforce its own piracy laws were difficult due to 
the fact that James I inherited the debt Elizabeth left and the standing navy was comprised of 
only a few vessels (Neufeld, 2011). These problems forced James I to continue to depend on 
privateers to supress piracy and continue England’s quest for Maritime dominance. 
As the 17th century progressed, the English economy grew more stable due to “the 
development of England’s small network of colonies and trading posts into a commercial empire 
brought with it immense wealth and new methods of commerce” (Neufeld, 2011, p. 9). Focus 
now became how to protect this economy instead of subversively attacking another’s. The first 
Vice-Admiralty Court was set up in Trinity, Newfoundland in 1615 (Horwood, 2011, p. 13) to 
deal with piracy in the Americas, but it did little in the ensuing years, and so instead England 
resorted again to “press-ganging” men onto privateers in order to combat piracy (Horwood, 
2011).  
As the balance of power shifted toward the English in the Americas, they sought to 
protect their new status, and that included the need to keep a tight rein on the colonies that were 
blossoming an ocean away. The Navigation Acts of 1651 were passed for the purpose of forcing 
the colonies to trade only with Britain, but instead, this restrictive law only succeeded in 
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facilitating the rise of piracy and semi-legitimate privateering in what is now New England & 
Atlantic Canada (Horwood, 2011, p. 13). Neufeld disagrees with this countering that “some 
piratical economic activities, such as smuggling and the influx of pirated goods, persisted, the 
risk of destabilizing the political climate and creating conflict was seen as extremely unprofitable 
by both the English state and the commercial community” (2011, p. 9-10). Both views have 
merit because it was at this time that England herself moved away from supporting piracy, but 
through trying to supress it through legitimate channels, only ended up causing it to evolve and 
find other means of continuing. This happened through the corruption of government officials 
from New England to the Carolinas as they issued illegal Letters of Marque and even went to far 
as to hide pirates in their mansions (Horwood, 2011, p. 13). 
When King William took the throne in 1688 (Marsters, 2004, p. 17), he turned New 
France into a war zone for over a decade in yet another colonial struggle that finally ended with 
the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 (Marsters, 2004, p. 24). The treaty returned both 
England and France’s possessions back to their original pre-war status. In response to this, 
Marsters states that the “years of extreme effort, of terror, peril, and gallantry were, in effect, for 
nothing” (2004: 24). It can be argued, however, that it was King William’s War that changed the 
landscape of North America because it forced each side to move the battle from purely economic 
terms into one that focused on the importance of possession of the land itself, partly due to 
France’s inability or disinterest in providing the necessary resources to fortify New France 
(Marsters, 2004, p. 24). Furthermore, it was the victories won by d’Ibereville (2004: 17-24), New 
France’s boldest soldier and corsair (Marsters, 2004, 23), that forced England to put more time 
and resources into gaining ground in North America, and thus tipped the balance of power, 
setting the stage for the taking of Port-Royal. 
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After the war, King William’s Piracy Act of 1698 was developed in an effort to enact 
“law better suited to the suppression of piracy and the promotion of trade within the Empire. The 
resulting law allowed for immediate trial and judgment by local Admiralty courts whereas the act 
of 1536 required all trials to take place in London (Neufeld, 2011, p. 12), but without the 
sufficient backing of law courts and an adequate navy, the law was one of a growing stack that 
was insufficient to deal with the problem that was likely the product of many years, on England’s 
part, of moral flexibility when it came to pirates.  
Atlantic Canada to 1759: Privateering’s Effect on Settlement  
It is impossible to tell of Canada’s history without weaving in an intricate tapestry of 
peoples, wars, treaties, colonization, Fortresses and sieges of those fortresses. It is a story that 
incorporates more than one discipline for more than one audience. The result might not be linear, 
and will not include all of the elements, but it will impart the understanding of how privateers, so 
long neglected in Canadian history, shaped more of it than most of us know.  
The relative isolation of North America from Europe allowed a unique and particular 
culture to develop that we cannot fully appreciate in the modern era. From a European 
perspective, mercantilist ambition played a part in reaping of the benefits of this land and sea 
(Andrews, 1964, p. 232) but most, save the French, did not seriously attempt to colonize North 
America until the middle of the 18th century. There were pockets of English colonization, but 
they were used mainly for fur trading, fishing camps, or strategic forts used to fight the French 
and their dominance in the fisheries (Vachon, 1985, p. 169). 
From a North American perspective, the years were long and tumultuous between 1651 
and 1759, the year the French were finally defeated in the fight for Canada (Vachon, 1985, 
p.173). It was a world that saw many wars between the French and English that played out with 
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undertones of colonial supremacy; King William’s War, The War of Spanish Succession, and the 
War of Austrian Succession. Even the Seven Years War, which was a much larger conflict than 
just North America, also played a part in the struggle. It was “more than a war of the imperialist 
powers in the colonies, but it was more a war to conquer the trading supremacy of the world. It 
was a subversive war” (Vachon, 1985, p. 17). There was also, in this world, a constant sway of 
allegiance between the British and the French within the Native populations (Horwood, 2003, p. 
14). So too, both the fish and fur trade characterized where exactly Imperial powers could and 
would lay claim in a taking and ceding of areas rich in natural resources (Horwood, 1978, p. 49-
59).  
The hub of all economic activity before 1749, and even before Montreal rose to 
prominence was Newfoundland and the very important Grand Banks. With no navy major naval 
presence in Newfoundland, and a weak government, the scores of “Masterless Men” (Horwood 
2011, p. 142) truly helped build up both privateering crews and pirate crews alike for almost 100 
years by providing “a ‘nursery of seamen’ for pirates as well as the navy” (Conlin, 2019). It was 
into this culture that the fight for supremacy between France and England was fought and the 
importance of Scottish Colonial Governor Samuel Vetch capturing Annapolis Royal meant that, 
finally, there was a significant English foothold in North America. This capture preceded the 
Treaty of Utrecht in an ominous warning for the French (Vachon, 1985, 136). He was also 
instrumental in encouraging the British to develop Nova Scotia for the resources and strategic 
position (1985, p. 135).  
The Treaty of Utrecht, which put an end to the war in 1713, proved extremely costly for 
New France in the form of fish, fur, land, and Native allies (Vachon, 1985, p. 130). It also 
effectively finished off the job English privateers began in undermining French fishing and trade 
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as “chaos returned” (Horwood, 1978, p. 54) in the form of an “epidemic of piracy and 
privateering” (1978: 54), paving the way for the greatest move of piracy the world has known: 
The Golden Age. It was at this point that France lost its hold in the Americas, though it would 
take 50 more years before New France finally fell into British control (Vachon, 1985, p. 130).  
The single most important event that preceded the loss of New France to England was the 
capturing of Louisbourg in 1758 (Vachon, 1985, p. 169), for it was the last stronghold of New 
France. The symbol of their wealth from fishing and furs, and the only thing that kept English 
from dominating the Atlantic waters of North America. The final blow would come the next year 
when the French were defeated on the Plains of Abraham. “New France was no more” (Vachon, 
1985, p. 131).  
Privateering from 1759 Onward  
The next section of “privateering history can hardly be told without a caveat” (Conlin, 2019), 
because even though it can be told as a straightforward chain of event, there is always an 
underlying question of legality (Horwood, 2003, p. 15). In Atlantic Canada, privateering 
“separates itself into distinct eras based on European and colonial wars that involved Nova 
Scotia” (Conlin, 1998, p. 80), and it is during this period that there develops a sharp division, a 
distinction between pirate and privateer. This is for three reasons. One, the founding of Halifax 
and the Vice-Admiralty Court meant a permanent British Navy presence in the Maritimes. Two, 
in the latter part of the 18th century and up to 1856, when privateering was abolished, it was a 
very carefully regulated practice, and on these shores, at least, it was deemed respectable, albeit 
resented by the navy as competition for prize money (Kert, 1997, p. 80). Three, international 
cooperation and the rise of the nation-state further regulated activity in places that were 
considered ungovernable or “no man’s land” (Horwood, 2011, p. 8) in times past. 
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The fact that privateers existed at all Canadian history, and even enduring as their 
practice did, shows their necessity. Isolated colonies like “Acadia and Nova Scotia also 
benefitted from privateering by providing both offense and defence when naval presence was 
minimal” (Conlin, 2019), that is, before serious British colonization with the founding of Halifax 
in 1749. There was also a need for a new settlement in Nova Scotia that would act as “a 
permanent counterweight to Louisbourg, which had been given back to the French” (Marsters, 
2004, p. 69) after the War of the Austrian Succession (Vachon, 1985, p. 30). Strategically 
important, Halifax was chosen for its long natural harbour that was easily defensible. A Vice-
Admiralty Court of Halifax was also set up alongside the town in 1749 (Kert, 1997 p. 49) as the 
British needed a base in the Maritimes to oversee privateers, the navy, and to prosecute pirates.   
Privateering during this time also brought with it “an added bonus of a local economic boost” 
(Conlin, 2019) as ships needed supplies, repairs, taverns and businesses did well, and there was 
money injected into the economy in the form of prizes (Conlin, 1998, p. 88). During the Seven 
Years' War, Halifax took so enthusiastically to privateering that “the governor of the day 
complained that workers could think of little else” (Conlin, 1998, p. 80). There was also security 
in being a privateering base, like Liverpool. “Before privateering, the appearance of any strange 
sail on the horizon was a cause for alarm. After privateering, a strange sail became welcomed as 
it often meant a captured enemy ship being sent in by a local privateer” (Conlin, 1998, p. 88, as 
cited in Perkins & Fergusson, 1967). Liverpool also played a part in the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars with 12 privateers and thirty armed merchant ships” commissioned 
(Conlin, 1998, p. 80). 
One of the most important wars during which Atlantic Canadian privateers played a part 
was the American Revolution. According to Conlin (2019), the Americans were “looking for 
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excuses to invade Canada, capture the rest of North America. They think it will be easy: ‘A mere 
matter of marching’.” Beginning in 1775, aggressive and unlicensed (Conlin, 2009b, p. 19) rebel 
privateers who never actually went pirate, like the Washington and Lizard (Marsters, 2004: 87) 
raided up and down the coasts of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, P.E.I., and Newfoundland, 
robbing and burning houses, and destroying fishing vessels, especially concentrating on those 
villages sympathetic to the rebels (Conlin, 2009b, p. 19-20). In response, formerly “pro-
American ports like Liverpool” turned and fought off the Americans, driving them back, and 
“with their own fleet of privateer schooners” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 20) taking the battle to the coast 
of New England. In all, seventy-seven privateering licenses granted, and Nova Scotia’s 
privateers took eighty American vessels (Conlin, 1998, p. 80. The sheer brutality of the suffered 
by the people in the Maritimes roused anti-American sentiment which, in turn, fuelled British 
pride. It has been said that it was the privateers who turned the tide by fighting valiantly, even to 
the point of keeping the Maritimes “out of the new American Republic” (Conlin, 2009b, p. 20). 
The War of 1812 was history’s last war that “privateering played a significant role” 
(Conlin, 1998, p. 80). Privateers took 200 American ships, including an estimated 50 the 
Liverpool Packet (Conlin, 1998, p. 80), arguably Canada’s most famous privateer, however, not 
everyone was convinced that privateers should have been used in this conflict. Horwood says of 
the War of 1812  
In Nova Scotia...The naval commanders were opposed to privateering altogether. If 
an auxiliary fleet were needed, they felt the ships should be commandeered and 
commissioned under the direct orders of the naval commanders. This, however, 
would have cost a great deal, and in the end wealthy shipowners were allowed to 
wage war for private gain (Horwood 2011: 164) 
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Decline of Privateering 
The decline and abandonment of the practice of privateering is complicated, both by 
conflicting opinions as to why it was so and overshadowing it all was the continued debate about 
its legality. After the Golden Age, piracy declined as nation-states were on the rise and their 
navies grew considerably, thus shrinking the hunting grounds pirates enjoyed in the Americas. 
What was left was privateering, which was basically piracy with a veneer of respectability, for it 
was commissioned to undertake what were essentially acts of piracy. Therefore privateering, by 
any other name, is still predatory. 
After the War of 1812 both piracy and privateering were in decline. The British Royal 
Navy now firmly based on this side of the Atlantic, “began patrolling the high seas with fast 
sloop-of-war especially fitted out for capturing pirates” (Horwood, 2003, p. 14) with piracy in 
the Atlantic finally being suppressed (mostly) by the end of the 19th century (2003: 14). 
Privateering itself was abolished in 1856 with the signing of the Declaration of Paris (Conlin, 
2009b, p. 20).  
Of this, Janice Thomson writes that privateering was ultimately abandoned as a result of 
the rise of the nation-state. “Two factors were crucial to the decline of mercenarism and other 
forms of non-state violence: the transformation of the state into the nation state and the rise of 
the citizen” (Thomson, 1990, p.43).   
There is also the consideration of globalization, the development of international law, and 
international cooperation on matters such as piracy that influenced lawmakers to abandon the 
practice, but everyone from Conlin to Kert agree that economic necessity was the motivation in 
undertaking the risky business of privateering. “Like Conlin, [Kert] argues that economic 
necessity, rather than patriotic zeal, was the primary motivation of most privateers” (Sutherland, 
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2005). It was likely the same motivation that prompted states to back away from private navies 
who plundered for economic gain. In short, privateers were both competition for legitimate trade 
as well as a liability in matters of international relations.  
The Renegades – A Word Regarding Privateers Who Turn Pirate 
The general attitude of the time toward those privateers who turned pirate, especially during the 
Elizabethan age, was one of tolerance, or at the least the turning of a “blind eye” (Conlin, 2009b, 
p. 11). Even Richard Whitbourne, an English noble who was captured by privateers turned pirate 
three times called them “erring English captains” (Whitbourne, 1870, p. 14), which does not 
seem to indicate a strong judgement on the morality of the practice, but rather, it imparts an 
acquiescence, or at the least a passive attitude. 
Labels are important as one word can signify much more than just a definition. Attached 
to that one word may be cultural or legal connotations, and even societal expectations. Piracy is 
one of those words. It is an ancient word, and so full of meaning that no matter where one is 
from the meaning is clear, so clear that there would be no redeeming it. This is not so for the 
word privateer; a fairly modern term. The entry in the Oxford Dictionary puts its origin at mid 
17th century, and it is a combination of the words private and volunteer, or “on the pattern of 
volunteer” (Oxford Dictionary, n.d.). That meaning, combined with the Letter of Marque (also a 
fairly new term), or that label, must have changed out of necessity. 
The Letter of Marque was used by the English from the end of the Middle Ages and 
onward, but not in conjunction with the term privateer until the middle of the 17th century.  
Sometimes labels show more about what someone is attempting to conceal more than what they 
are attempting to convey. For example, Jowitt uses Sir Francis Drake as an example of how the 
word piracy is used “to explore the ways seaborne crime was, in certain circumstances, 
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represented as central to the cultural construction of English imperial aspirations” (Jowitt, 2010, 
p. 47). It is not a secret that Drake was a favourite of Queen Elizabeth, as he was knighted by 
her. But he was also known as El Draco, the feared and hated pirate (Conlin, 2009b, p. 9). 
Lincoln, commenting on Jowitt’s assertion that the perception of the label of pirate, as applied to 
Drake’s activities, was fluid. She writes, “pirates were criminals on the one hand, and on the 
other, tools of foreign policy undermining the monopolistic practices of the Spanish Empire” 
“changing representations of piracy over the reigns of three monarchs, from Elizabeth I to 
Charles I, shows developing attitudes toward seaborne crime as shifting political circumstances 
shaped attitudes towards the criminality of piracy” specifically because of the “increasing 
politicisation of pirate characters and piracy” (Lincoln, 2011, p. 72). Nowhere was this more 
apparent than when pardoned pirate, ex-privateer Sir Henry Manwayring wrote a treatise on how 
to supress pirates, presenting it to King James I after being pardoned for piracy. Here he tries to 
convince the king that privateering would be a good alternative to piracy as their numbers grew 
greatly since the death of Queen Elizabeth I.  
…me thinketh the best and surest way, and that which might much advance the 
wealth and glory of our State, were to devise some more universal employment than 
now we have, by which men of that spirit might not complain, as they now do, that 
they are forced for lack of convenient employment to enter into such unlawful 
courses. The proof of this is plain, for since your Highness' reign there have been 
more Pirates by ten for one, than were in the whole reign of the last Queen 
(Manwayring, 1920, p. 41) 
Manwayring must have convinced the resistant king to commission privateers because it is not 
long after this that the term was widely used and used in conjunction with the Letter of Marque 
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(1920: 41). Why go to all the trouble? The answer lies in the lengths the English went to 
legitimize the privateering; a word with no previous connotations. 
History of Letter of Marque 
The Letter of Marque and Reprisal heavily borrows from the French terms to “Reprende 
and Reprize, to retake one thing for another” (Justice, 1710, p. 461) or literally translated as 
“resume recovery”. It was an amalgamation of the terms, Pignoratia (modern Spanish: 
pignoraticio) meaning “secured”, Clarigatio (Latin) meaning “reparation or fine”, and 
Androlepsia (Greek), which was an ancient Greek custom used to exact a combination of justice 
and revenge. Ancient people would use a Letter of Marque and Reprisal “in Imitation of the 
Androlepsia among the Greeks, to seize the three next Citizens of that Place wither the Murderer 
had fled” (Justice, 1710, p. 461). 
What was the exact nature of the Letter of Marque as it pertained to the 16th through the 
19th centuries? Was it a legal document that justified the privateer’s right to steal and harm 
foreign peoples? Or was it just a legal formality in matters of international relations, void of any 
real power? Did it exist mainly to serve and to protect the monarch who issued them? Below is a 
quote from the book A general treatise of the dominion of the sea, written in 1710 by Alexander 
Justice. In this passage he explains how and why the Letter of Marque came to be used in 
modern (his) times: 
Tho' by the Law of Nature one Man's Goods are not to be try'd for the Debts of another, 
nor tho•e of the Publick; yet this Cu•tom has been introduced by the voluntary Law of 
Nations…For this Rea•on, as the Great Ju•tinian ob•erves, was this Law of Reprizals 
e•tabli•h'd by the Con•ent Of Nations, becau•e 'twas grounded on the Urgency of 
Human Wants, a••erted with the greate•t Nece••ities, without this great Nece••lty, 
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Licen•e would be given and tolerated for the committing of Depredations and Injuries" 
(Justice, 1710, p. 461) 
So, in effect, it was the urgency of, and demand for revenge of the people that prompted the 
monarchy to grant these Letters of Marque to recover what was stolen from them. Justice (1710) 
was careful to add that it was not within the law, or custom for one person, or the public in 
general, to pay for the loss of goods of another. Furthermore, it was the “Urgency of Human 
Wants” that precipitated it, for the alternative was a tolerance for piracy that would ensue should 
the permission not be granted (p. 461). In short, it was the monarchy that was used by the people 
to licence the acquiring of personal gain as revenge for personal loss.  
 It makes sense then that the monarchy refused to officially back the privateer with 
official power. Then, in a mutually beneficial relationship, the monarchy used an official office 
to sanction the practice while enabling the state to wage a war without any involvement 
(culpability), responsibility (no legal recourse), or foreign relations (no diplomatic ties or formal 
declarations of war, in that respect). Furthermore, issuing a Letter of Marque was minimal risk 
for a very good return. Horwood puts it best when he writes “to the privateer’s victim he was 
often a pirate and sometimes a criminal just as vicious as Blackbeard or any other freebooter of 
the Spanish Main” (2011, p. 18), meaning perspective was relative to the side one happened to 
inhabit.  
The Letter of Marque was also an international document, but this was only in respect to 
the government that it was issued under, and then only recognized in conjunction with other 
Letters of Marque issued by those nations that had trading agreements under the Law of Nations 
(Justice, 1710, p. 462). Its jurisdiction was limited to those places not regarded as independent 
entities, such as North and South America.  These territories were not treated as, but looked upon 
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as ungoverned ones, to be exploited and/or traded with (Tawney & Power, 1924, p. 19-21). 
Imperialist ambition also played large role in the location of the territory where the privateer 
made his living and, as a natural consequence, virtually all of his hunting grounds were 
undertaken far from Europe, so therefore could be categorized as international in scope (Justice, 
1710, p.462). Later, as English colonial efforts increased, some privateers were permanently 
based in the Americas, but they were still technically categorized as international as they were 
governed from England, and only preyed upon foreign vessels (Sutherland, 2005). 
A Letter of Marque and Reprisal was never meant as a replacement for the navy and was 
not always enacted in times of war. Its purpose was to obtain justice, just not in the way we 
understand today. It was considered an act of war between individuals, and not states. “In 
countries of the common law, at least, arbitrary distinctions between private and public right or 
duty were still far in the future. The universal law was law for individuals no less than for states” 
(Dickinson, 1952, p. 27). In fact, it was important for states that they did not become involved, 
and if the actions of a privateer endangered the state, it was put off.  “But if the Supreme Power 
thinks the Execution of those Letters of Reprisal cannot well be e••ected without endangering the 
Peace of both Estates, it may be respited till a more convenient Time offers” (Justice, 1710, p. 
463). So, the Letter of Marque was also used in place of the absence of International Law and 
Justice, at the time still in its infancy, as evidenced in the Law of Nations (Dickinson, 1952, p. 
26-27) who governed economic relations during the Middle Ages and onward. Eventually 
international law evolved as we know it today, yet that foundational premise for such vigilante 
justice was built upon the need for revenge (Justice, 1710, p. 461), but in modern times there are 
no provisions within any Western law that allow the public to administer their own justice. 
  




Analysis - Applying OC to Privateering 
  
Applying Definitions of OC to Privateers  
This research applied two definitions of Organized Crime to the business of Privateering; the UN 
definition, and the Canadian one. Both definitions of OC are very similar, with the Canadian one 
being deliberately modelled after the UN definition. For comparison purposes, the EU taxonomy 
was used as it was built from the UN definition, and expanded (Schneider, 2017, p. 45) to 
include Schneider’s 23-Point Taxonomy of an Organized Criminal Conspiracy. Both definitions 
are included below: 
The UN Definition of OC 
The Convention does contain a definition of 'organized criminal group'. In Article 2(a): 
a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; 
existing for a period of time; 
acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years' 
incarceration; 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (Schneider, 2017, p. 
43). 
The Canadian Definition of OC 
According to Section. 467.1(1) Criminal Code of Canada: 
A criminal organization is “a group, however organized, that 
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and 
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(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or 
more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a 
material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who 
constitute the group.  
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate commission of a 
single offence” (Schneider, 2017, p. 43-44). 
The only difference between the above definitions is that the UN definition adds a 
specific length of sentence that would a criminal act would carry. Privateering would technically 
apply to both, but they are too broad to draw a definitive conclusion, therefore also applied here 
is Stephen Schneider’s 23-point Comprehensive Taxonomy of the Characteristics of an 
Organized Crime Conspiracy. It is used below to compare each point with all known 
characteristics of the behaviours and activities employed by privateers during their course of 
commission.  
Rationale for Using Schneider’s Typology of OC 
The purpose in creating a model of organized crime influences how it may or may not be used. 
Specific law enforcement objectives, political objectives, or even bias of what may constitute an 
organized crime conspiracy can influence the addition or omission of characteristics, leaving that 
system of classification with either too broad of a scope or one that is too restrictive, when 
attempting to apply a set of characteristics that does not specifically fall within the mandate of 
the model.    
This research has also examined two other models of organized crime, one created by the 
EU, and the other created by the RCMP, and has found that neither model fit this research in 
terms of classification of the characteristics of privateering as a business, or the behavioural 
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characteristics of the privateer. Speaking of the purpose in using a crime model, von Lampe says, 
“the importance ascribed to models in the study of organised crime lies not so much in 
presenting final conclusion. Rather, models here are treated as heuristic devices that guide and 
systemize research” (2011: 302). 
Included in Appendix 1.1 is the RCMP model. The premise of this model is what is 
called a “threat assessment model” (Schneider, 2017, p.79). This model focuses on those 
characteristics that law enforcement would use in identifying and combatting a specific threat to 
Canadian society that they may encounter in the course of their work. The characteristics are not 
the type that would be useful in classifying the privateer as an organized criminal because they 
were compiled with the aim in identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting people who pose a 
specific threat to a specific community.  
In Appendix 1.2, the EU taxonomy attributes 11 characteristics to identify an OC 
conspiracy. Only six need be included to determine if a group is a criminal organization, but the 
following four characteristics must be included: (1) collaboration of more than two people, (3) in 
operation for a prolonged or indefinite periods of time, (5) suspected of the commission of 
serious criminal offences, and (11) pursues profit and/or power (Schneider, 2017, p. 78). This 
research did not fit with this model because some of the criterion were too narrow in scope, and 
others too broad. For example, while it can be argued that running a privateer ship requires more 
than two people, and it could therefore easily fit into the EU model, it can also be said that it can 
too easily fit into the model. The intention behind the EU using such a low number as part of 
their definition had more to do with flexibility in the classifying of a particular group of 
offenders, however small, and then determining if those that are involved can be considered as 
part of a core group of offenders, than opting for a more restrictive one. It is for this reason that 
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including number one in the EU model seems both too narrow and too broad at the same time. 
The same can be said for each of the four core characteristics. 
The above reasons, taken together, most fit using Schneider’s Comprehensive Taxonomy 
of the Characteristics of an Organized Crime Conspiracy. Each of the characteristics were 
concise and could easily be applied or rejected, without ambiguity, when attempting to classify a 
suspected criminal organization. Each of the points below will include the listed description 
found in Canadian Organized Crime, and then the application each of the points to known 
characteristics of privateers.  
A Comprehensive Taxonomy of the Characteristics of an Organized Crime 
Conspiracy 
Organizational: 
1. Multiple offenders: Yes 
The more people that are involved in a profit-oriented criminal conspiracy, the greater the 
requirement that these people and the activities they carry out are organized (p. 83). 
Section 467.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code defines a criminal organization as three or 
more people conspiring together 
Applying this classification is clear because, in order to operate successfully, each 
privateering vessel required more people than a typical merchant ship’s crew, who had between 
10-20 men (Horwood, 2011, p. 11). The reason being is that “the aim was to capture ships with 
as little damage as possible” (Horwood, 2011, p. 16), and also for practical reasons as it took 
more people to man cannons and guns or to sail a captured prize (Hillman & Gathmann, 2011, p. 
734). This meant that (most of the time), a privateer ship would employ between 40 and 50 men 
(Schneider, 2017, as cited in Kert, 1997: 157) ensured the intimidation factor alone would 
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convince the merchant vessel to surrender quickly. Their commission being accomplished with 
little or no physical violence was paramount as an intact ship was “the privateersman’s sole hope 
of reward” (Horwood, 2011, p.16).  
2. A systematic pattern in the relationship of the offenders: Yes 
To constitute an OC conspiracy, there must not only be multiple offenders, there must also 
be a systematic pattern to the relationship among these offenders. This systematic pattern 
of relationship must feature a structure that is deliberate and functionally purposive for 
the committing of offences, and to also serve the broader goals of the criminal conspiracy 
(Schneider, 2017, p.83). Two basic types of criminal relationship are identified by Ianni 
(1974): associational network model and an entrepreneurial model, with some groups being 
made up of both types. The first one, the associational network, is “a close personal 
relationship among the offenders and includes a strong sense of mutual trust” (p. 83-84). 
Associational ties include familial, regional, kinship, or based loosely on ethnicity, though 
the last view is somewhat controversial, as seen in Alien Conspiracy Theory & Ethnic 
Succession Theory (Schneider, 2017, p. 107-116). Instead, Schneider explains how a 
concept called Social Embeddedness, refers to how criminal ties are often built on existing 
familial, social, and professional relationships (as cited in van de Bundt, Siegel, and Zaitch, 
2014) rather than ethnicity. The second, or entrepreneurial model, is a bond that is 
economic in focus and organized using either a hierarchical or symmetrical relationship 
(Schneider, 2017, p.84-85). 
The relationship between the sailors aboard a privateer vessel was complicated and can 
be categorized as both associational and entrepreneurial. On one hand, the bond between those 
on a privateering vessel was purely economic (Horwood, 2011, p. 16). All of the privateers were 
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on the ship in order to make a profit; a well-paid job, if successful. On the other hand, all those 
aboard a privateer ship were all sailors, in a job that experience and/or expertise. This can be 
categorized as associational as every man identified as a sailor. There was no need to involve 
kinship ties, ethnic ties, or even regional ties because the privateers came from many 
nationalities, ethnic backgrounds, and even different regions (Conlin, 1998, p. 87).   
In order to operate successfully each crew had to have a Letter of Marque, an authorized 
mandate from the Crown, which further cemented the relationship between the privateer captain 
(who may or may not be the owner) and his crew of men who worked together with the aim of 
capturing ships as prizes, relieving them of their cargo, and selling it for a profit.  
3. Specialization/Division of Labour: Yes 
In his book Canadian Organized Crime, Schneider explains that a division of labour as 
utilized by an organized criminal group will see specific functions divided among offenders 
according to its particular power structure. In a hierarchical organizational structure, the 
top position would possess the most power, have the most responsibility, and see the least 
amount of manual or menial labour. As one moves down the hierarchy one would assume 
more and more menial tasks with the least amount of power. In a symmetrical 
organizational structure, each participant may assume equal amounts of responsibility 
with their duties focused more on specialized skill rather than on a relationship based upon 
power (Schneider, 2017, p. 85-86). 
A privateering vessel can be said to have been organized in both a strict hierarchy and a 
network of specialized crew members. To be successful, a privateering ship required an 
organized crew that worked together. This required a captain, first mate, quartermaster, 
boatswain, right down to cabin boy in a hierarchy that was likened to the navy, or at least a 
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militia (Marsters, 2004, p. 11). Practically speaking, sailing a ship with accurate navigation, in all 
types of weather, and possessing the skills to successfully capture a merchant vessel also 
required a high level of organization and division of labour. Some crew members were 
responsible for more than one job at a time, but no-one came on board without a purpose. 
Whether a ship was a privateer, a navy ship, or a pirate ship, the tasks required to run a 
successful ship did not change, the major difference among them was their mandate, or lack 
thereof (Horwood, 2011, p. 8).  
4. Insulation against law enforcement: Yes 
Many criminal groups organize in such a way that they gain the ability to insulate and 
protect individual members from arrest and prosecution. In this way, the entire group is 
protected as well, ensuring the group is fortified and will endure past any loss of individual 
members (Schneider, 2017, p. 86). Some groups use lower ranking members to carry out 
the tasks that attract the attention of law enforcement, with successful behaviour rewarded 
and unsuccessful behaviour punished. Other groups rely on rules of engagement or taking 
an oath to secure protection of the higher-ranking members. 
Maritime Law regulating of the business of privateering evolved over the centuries, but 
the one thing that did not change was the use of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal. This 
document ensured that the deliberately violent and predatory acts committed by privateers would 
be protected because they were commissioned to do so, under the law. Since Piracy was 
considered to be well protected by the nobility, merchants, officials, gentlemen, and admiralty 
officials, they could hardly be prosecuted since this lot was responsible for, not only enacting the 
law, but enforcing the law (Schneider, 2017, p. 7). 
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The regulations involved at most points in history left a lot of room for a broad 
interpretation of their mandated activities with little oversight or recourse for those that broke the 
rules. For example, privateers were generally expected to complete their mission with as little 
violence as possible, but it was not ruled out, and if violent measures could be shown to be 
justified, then it was allowed, including murder. Murder, theft, and violence are all punishable 
offences in every region that privateers operated, therefore their ability to employ these measures 
in the course of their duty, with impunity, shows the level of their insulation from law 
enforcement measures. That is not to say there were no consequences. The privateer’s activities 
straddled the line of what may be considered crime, and even piracy, therefore they were 
constantly in danger of paying a heavy price should their activities be declared out of bounds, 
and sometimes that decision was made arbitrarily by a ruling monarch, as in the case of Henry 
Mainwaring, who was in the perfect position to know of such things. He petitioned the king for 
permission to attack Spanish ships in peacetime and his request was granted with the stipulation 
that he refrain from attacking Spanish ships in Europe, and instead concentrating on Spain’s 
ships in Western waters (Horwood, 2011, p. 34-35). He did not listen and paid the price with a 
prison sentence. When he wrote Of the Beginnings, Practices, and Suppression of Pirates a few 
years later he acknowledged that protection from the threat of consequences emboldens one to 
commit crime.  “For questionless, as fear of punishment makes men doubtful to offend, so the 
hope of being pardoned makes them apter to err” (Manwayring, 1920, p. 43).  
5. Specialized channels or modes of communication: Yes 
Some criminal groups use measures to protect communication among offenders. It can be 
protected in one of two ways: 
1) Taking steps to ensure that criminal communication is not intercepted by police.  
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2) Structuring communication in such a way that it cannot be interpreted by police. 
Channels of communication:  
a) Hierarchical groups: lower ranking members have access to only those only 
directly above them (no direct communication with leaders) 
b) Networks: limited communication between different cells with much of it 
occurring through a central “broker” (Schneider, 2017, p. 87). 
The importance of communications in the privateering era put more emphasis on 
relationships between those carrying on the business rather than any attempt to protect their 
communications from a higher authority. The hierarchy of a privateering vessel would have 
followed much the same power structure as a navy ship, and in some instances, governed more 
like a pirate ship, but, according to Dan Conlin, they would have “mostly reflected the economic 
and social class ashore” (1998, p. 89).  A strict hierarchy prevented regular crew from 
communicating with the Vice-Admiralty, the monarchy, or the owner of the ship, if the owner 
was not the captain. The captain and the owner were usually the only ones that had any 
communication with the reigning monarch, or the Vice-Admiralty since regular ship mates 
would have little reason to communicate with them.  
As far as networks go, the only real documented communication between privateering 
vessels was when a privateer would share intelligence regarding an enemy with either the militia 
or the navy (Marsters, 2004: 11), but no other documented evidence of a network of 
communication between privateers was found, although it would be naïve to dismiss any 
collusion between them outright, especially during times when they were far from home and any 
regulating body. Manwayring writes that this information would be useful “if there should be 
any purpose to employ Ships for the suppressing of Pirates” (Manwayring, 1920, p. 25). From 
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page 25 to 40 he details what conditions they worked in while abroad, including weather, the 
location of potential enemies, and dangers faced by local authorities in ports that were important 
to international trade. This information would have been very useful to privateers 
communicating with other ships of their own country while abroad, but it must be emphasized 
that they were, for the most part, in competition with one another, therefore communication was 
likely at a minimum.  
6. Limited or exclusive membership. Implied 
In some criminal groups limited or exclusive membership might be used to ensure the 
groups core ideals, or continued existence, is kept in tact. Group membership is predicated 
on some form of binding relationship among members, and may be based on nationality, 
kinship, or ethnicity, criminality, or specialty in a necessary skill used by the group. 
Membership implies a greater level of responsibility, monetary and other benefits such as 
influence, power, and prestige (Schneider, 2017, p. 88). 
Membership is automatically limited on the basis of experience or expertise in joining a 
privateering vessel, and owning one was only reserved for the merchant class, as the Letter of 
Marque was reserved only for those merchants who suffered economic losses in wartime, and 
only if, by petition, granted a Letter of Marque (Marsters, 2004, p. 6). The crew would be made 
up of those who had experience on the sea, including “working class of fishermen, forest 
workers and deep-sea sailors” (Conlin, 1998, p. 86).  Other than the obvious there were really no 
restrictions as to who could join a crew, but it was likely based upon the personal preference of 
the captain.   
  




7. Recruitment: Yes 
In order to successfully continue operations, and even survive, OCG must recruit members 
that provide vital functions in the course of their criminal activity (Schneider, 2017, p. 88). 
Recruitment may also serve as a point of indoctrination in that outsiders on the periphery 
of certain OC groups are attracted by the group’s well-known reputation, and thus are 
easily recruited from that pool of people. 
Privateering vessels relied heavily on recruitment due to the constant shortage of men 
willing and able to join the crew for sometimes months or years at a time. Colourful ads 
promising “riches and honour” (Conlin, 1998, p. 79) were written in newspapers, on posters, and 
nothing seemed to be off-limits as crew was recruited from other privateering vessels or even the 
navy (Horwood, 2011, p.16). Privateering captains were also authorized to force (press) men to 
join their crew in a practice known as press-ganging (Horwood: 2011: 14, Conlin, 2009: 11), but 
most of the time it was not necessary since life aboard a privateer ship was more profitable with 
less hardship (Horwood, 2011:16, Conlin, 1998: 85).  
8. Continuity/Continuing Enterprise: No 
In order to be prosecuted under section 467.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code, a 
criminal organization must have, as a defining feature, continuity, either by continued 
participation by its members or an enterprise that transcends its members. This is 
important because a group’s survival depends wholly upon continued resilience in spite of 
the multiple risks (imprisonment, death) facing an OCG. Continuing enterprise may mean 
a group that places more importance on the group as a whole than its individual members, 
which would ensure it lives past the loss of one or more leaders. In any case, there must be 
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more than one offence over a period of time to qualify as a criminal organization Section 
467.1(1) (Schneider, 2017, p. 88-89). 
The premise here, in determining a continuing enterprise, is that the business itself would 
continue past the life or leading of the captain. In some cases, such as the Liverpool Packet, there 
were multiple captains, but no matter who was the captain it was always owned by one principal 
owner, Enos Collins (Horwood, 2011, p. 163). Also, even though some ships undertook many 
missions that stretched over multiple years, no evidence could be located that indicated the core 
business or enterprise was bigger than that of the single ship or the principal owner. As a matter 
of fact, by the end of 1813 Enos Collins “had begun to retreat from privateering” (Fingard, 
Guilford, & Sutherland, 1999, p. 39) in favour of more lucrative ventures. This makes sense as it 
has been observed that those involved in a business involving crime will, as the saying goes, 
“Follow the money” 
Criminal enterprises come into existence, profit, and flourish because…there is a 
market dynamic at work which is independent of the criminality of any specific 
individual or group. It is inevitable that criminal enterprises will rise up to meet these 
demands and reap the profits (Southerland & Potter, 1993, p. 264)   
9. Multi-jurisdictional/transnational in scope: Yes 
An OCG whose criminal activity crosses borders, whether or not the perpetrators 
physically do so, can be said to be multijurisdictional or transnational in scope (Schneider, 
2017, p. 90). Some examples of activities that OCG participate in across borders are money 
laundering, terrorism, drug trafficking, arms dealing, hijacking of sea vessels or aircraft, 
human smuggling, etc. 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS                                                                                                                                          
42 
 
It is difficult to apply this characteristic in the modern sense because a major 
complication was that there was no international law overseeing the trading practices among 
different regions, and certainly none for the defining of international crime, at least not as we 
understand it today. The first governing body of any kind were the “fishing admirals” who 
settled fishing disputes in Newfoundland (Conlin, 2009, p. 11) before the first Vice-Admiralty 
court “was set up at Trinity in 1615” (Horwood, 2011, p. 13). With international law “at the time, 
still in its infancy, as evidenced in the Law of Nations (Dickinson, 1952, p. 26-27), the Letter of 
Marque was considered an international document, but only for the government that it was 
issued under, and only recognized in conjunction with other Letters of Marque issued by those 
nations that had trading agreements under the Law of Nations (Dickinson, 1952). Since North 
and South America were not treated as independent entities, but looked upon as ungoverned 
territories to be exploited and/or traded with, imperialist ambition played large role in the 
location of the territory where the privateer made his living and, as a natural consequence, 
virtually all of his hunting grounds were undertaken far from Europe, and therefore his actions 
could be categorized as international in scope. Later, as English colonial efforts increased, some 
privateers were permanently based in the Americas, but they were still technically categorized as 
international as they were still governed from England (Marsters, 2004, p. 6), and only preyed 
upon foreign vessels.  
 
10. Secrecy: No 
This point refers to the need for an OCG to protect their activities, interests, and 
participants from detection and prosecution by law enforcement. “Organized crime 
syndicates safeguard their secretive nature through violence, intimidation, insulation, 
corruption, as well as rules and eve established codes of conduct” (Schneider, 2017, p. 91). 
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Secrecy can only be applied here as far as the privateer would go to conceal his activity 
from those foreign vessels he preyed upon and their governments, but did not include his own 
government, unless he was breaking the agreement he was bound to under his Letter of Marque. 
While this did happen in some instances with privateers smuggling cargo into port rather than 
declaring it to the Vice-Admiralty court (Conlin, 1998, p. 89), it was not a normal occurrence.  
Commercial: 
11. Profit-oriented criminal activities: Yes 
The main goal of the OCG is to make a profit, therefore all criminal activities performed 
by that group are profit-oriented or support profit-oriented activities (Schneider, 2017, p. 
92). 
Classification of this characteristic is complex because, while we who live in the modern 
era consider the activities of the privateer to be crimes, those activities were legalized and 
mandated, albeit with strict regulations, in the later period (Conlin, 2009, p. 18). Each privateer 
captain and his crew, along with the owner (if there was one), targeted enemy vessels, capturing 
their ship and cargo by using various means of violence and intimidation, including plundering 
villages and kidnapping (Conlin, 2009, p. 14-15), torture (Marsters, 2004: 6, Horwood, 2011: 
18), and even murder (Conlin, 2009: 9, Horwood, 2011: 18). 
In addition, there was a distance between what the monarchy mandated through official 
means, and what subversive intentions were carried out through that mandate, that is, to weaken 
the economy of an opponent in wartime by using public measures rather than official ones. 
“Maritime merchant interests were integrated with the political elites, so overall, their demands 
were of government concern” (Mabee, 2009, p. 146). They were also employed to combat the 
piracy that threatened their own economy (Mabee, 2009, p. 46). In this way one could argue that 
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technically the monarchy was indulging in criminal practice by employing such tenuous means 
that they could be considered illegal, or at least acts of war in themselves (Horwood, 2011, p.8). 
Even though Privateering was technically legitimate there was a lawlessness that pervaded and 
permeated the business due to there being no real way to completely ensure that they were 
upholding the laws and regulations set out by their Letter of Marque (Conlin, 2009, p. 9). 
In sum, a privateering crew were all sailors and specialists of some kind, bound together 
by the Letter of Marque they sailed under and that commonality ensured they were all in the 
same place at the same time for one purpose: to make a profit. 
12. Serious illegal acts: Yes  
“The illegal acts committed by criminal organization are considered serious in the sense 
that they exact significant harm on victims and society as a whole” (Schneider, 2017, p. 92). 
For example, drug trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, and fraud. 
Each act that the privateer engaged in were serious ones in that they undoubtably exacted 
harm on both their victims and society (Marsters, 2004, p. 12). Targeting ships, boarding a ship, 
and using violent means to capture that ship and steal its cargo are all serious crimes, as is 
kidnapping, press-ganging, and in some cases, murder. Some privateers also targeted 
townspeople in coastal villages, taking supplies, and even burning villages, such as when 
Buccaneer Samuel Argall attacked and burned Port Royal in 1613 (Conlin, 2009, p. 15). 
As already mentioned, using the privateer as a subversive means in weakening the 
economy of the enemy in wartime served to also weaken an enemy’s ability to make war. These 
actions resulted in England gaining territory and mastery over trade routes and luxury goods, 
significantly harming all levels of the society they targeted by using these means.  
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Sometimes privateers even disregarded their commission by falsifying their Letter of 
Marque, or refusing to declare a prize, opting instead to smuggle it into port. Of this, Dan Conlin 
says that “some of the privateers, tired of waiting for the bureaucratic red tape in processing 
cargo, which sometimes took years to untangle, would resort to smuggling the cargo into port 
instead of declaring it” (1998: 89). 
13. Consensual and predatory crimes: Yes  
A consensual crime is one where no victim exists; that is, two or more individuals willingly 
engage in an illegal commercial transaction” (Schneider, 2017, p. 92). For example, drug 
trafficking, or gambling, prostitution. “Predatory crimes are those in which a victim 
suffers a direct physical or financial loss” (Schneider, 2017, p. 92). For example, human 
trafficking, extortion, or currency counterfeiting. 
The business of privateering was built upon actions that can be classified as predatory. 
Stalking foreign merchant ships with the sole purpose of hijacking it, stealing the cargo, and 
sometimes even the ship (Conlin, 1998, p. 88), is predatory. Of course, using violence and 
intimidation is also predatory.  
Classifying other actions of the privateer during his course of business as consensual is 
also possible, but doubtful. Some writers like Horwood allude to the average sailor escaping 
being pressed into the navy by willingly being pressed into privateering (2011: 16), but no 
evidence was found definitively supporting this point.  
14. Multiple enterprises: Yes 
Many OC groups participate in more than one type of profit-oriented activity and this can 
include legal activities in addition to illegal ones. 
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Some privateers owned another legitimate business at the same time, such as Enos 
Collins, Simeon Perkins, or the Kirke brothers, which was almost a given since the privateering 
class was made up of merchants. It was the owner/merchant who carried the expense as well as 
the risk in outfitting a privateering vessel. The risk was worth it, and the payoff was good, if one 
was successful, because it imported much more than it exported, which led Conlin exclaim that 
“privateering was easily understood in a mercantilist age” (1998: 79). Mercantilism is the belief 
that the economy grew if the businesses at home prospered without any goods or money leaving 
town, and the prize money that entered the town only added to the wealth. In that sort of mindset 
or worldview it made sense that plundering and pillaging those that rightfully exploited nations 
rich in trade goods was a good business decision on the part of the privateer, and a good tactical 
one on the part of the state.  
15. Monopolistic ambitions: No  
The ambition or attempt by an OCG to monopolize the sale of a good or service, or the sale 
of a good or service in a particular location. In the course of attaining this goal, the OCG 
will employ means such as threatened violence, violence, or a corruptive influence on 
government or union officials (Schneider, 2017, p. 93).  
It would have been impossible to gain a monopoly either in any of the geographic areas 
Maritime privateers sailed in, the privateering industry as a whole, or a combination of both. 
Some privateers owned more than one ship, but that did not at all mean that it was the privateer’s 
intention to gain a monopoly in the privateering business. Furthermore, an owner of a 
privateering ship would have no real ambition to gain any sort of monopoly because outfitting a 
ship was very expensive due to the need for cannons, guns, and extra men aboard (Hillman & 
Gathmann, 2011, p. 740) and obtaining a Letter of Marque was not guaranteed (Marsters, 2004, 
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p. 6). The uncertainty in the combined risks in undertaking even one commission meant it would 
likely not be feasible to attempt to hold any sort of monopoly in the privateering business. For 
example, outfitting a ship, and then sailing to a destination (and back) took a lot of time, and 
money. Even finding a ship to prey upon that held cargo that would make the gamble profitable, 
and it was a gamble, as Simeon Perkins found out when his newly outfitted vessel, the Charles 
Mary Wentworth, failed to capture a prize, and as a result he suffered major losses (Horwood, 
2011, p. 135). There was no way to know what type of harsh weather may be encountered, or 
heavily armed foreign naval vessels might be protecting the waters surrounding the coasts of a 
commissioned area. There was no way to know if one would encounter and engage in combat 
another privateer ship. Even naval vessels from one’s own country were competition in foreign 
waters (Marsters 2004, as cited in Kert, 1997: 80). There could be heavy losses of life due to 
sickness, disease, combat, or even mutiny.  
All of the above examples of risk would most certainly prevent a privateer from seeking 
to obtain a monopoly over a business filled with such uncertainty and risk.  
16. Operations tactics that support commercial activities: Yes  
“While most organized crimes directly generate revenue, others are carried out to...support 
the production, distribution, and marketing of its products and services” (Schneider, 2017, 
p. 93). These tactical activities may include violence, corruption, money laundering, 
intimidation, intelligence gathering, and counter-surveillance. 
Every action undertaken by a privateer in the course of a commission was geared toward 
obtaining stolen cargo that would later be sold for a profit. Operations tactics include activities 
undertaken both before and during the commission, and where deception, intimidation, and 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS                                                                                                                                          
48 
 
violence may also be used. In this point the commercial activity is the sale of the cargo, and 
every other action the privateer engages in would be in support of that.  
Before sailing, some examples of operations tactics used would be petitioning for a Letter 
of Marque, outfitting a ship with supplies and arms, recruiting crew members both through 
advertising and press-ganging men into service. 
Deceptive practices undertaken during the course of their commission would be preying 
upon foreign merchant ships in order to steal their cargo, disguising one’s ship as a merchant 
vessel, or lying in wait for a merchant vessel to pass. 
  Intimidation tactics used by privateers would be aggressively pursuing a merchant ship, 
running up a “Red Jack” flag (Conlin, 2009, p. 18), or firing off a warning shot. Examples of 
violent tactics used would be engaging other ships in combat, whether they be merchant, pirate, 
naval, or other privateers. Boarding a ship, perpetrating violence on men from that captured 
vessel. Some of the most brutal acts documented were those done by American privateers during 
the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The Americans wandered up and down the whole 
of the East coast from Saint John, N.B. to the fishing villages in Newfoundland, looting and 
burning homes and shops, as well as burning fishing vessels and ships along the way (Conlin, 
2009, p. 19-20). 
 
Behavioural: 
17. Chronic and serious offenders: Tentative Yes 
A chronic or serious offender is someone who is “habitually engaged in committing a 
variety of (serious) criminal offences” (Schneider, 2017, p. 94). 
Classification on this point was not made in considering that a privateer obtained more 
than one Letter of Marque or commission, and therefore would be considered a repeat offender, 
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but instead classification depends on only those who sailed under a Letter of Marque and as a 
pirate during their career. When the Treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713, it brought peace, and 
unemployment to the hundreds of privateers that roamed the seas, and thus the Golden Age of 
Piracy began (Horwood, 2011, p. 91-92), and so did the need to supress them. In the age of the 
Buccaneers, the easy shift from privateering to piracy was tolerated with “little consequence as 
long as they were successful” (Conlin, 2009, p. 9). Some, like Peter Easton and Sir Henry 
Mainwaring obtained a pardon, some did not. Some survived with their head, and some, like Sir 
Francis Drake, did not. Men like Edward Teach, who were lured over by greed, to sail under a 
pirate flag during the course of their career sometimes paid the price with their lives during their 
“evil course” (Conlin, 2009, p. 13.  
The point is, even though they may have been a product of their time, these men could be 
classified as chronic and serious offenders by displaying a lawlessness that cannot be interpreted 
in any other way when they chose to fly a pirate flag.   
18. Rationality: Yes 
“Criminal organizations are structured rationally to maximize their revenue generating 
function” (Schneider, 2017, p. 95). Rational Choice Theory states that offenders make 
rational choices in their decision to commit crimes. Organized crime represents the most 
rational form of criminality, which, like legitimate businesses, responds to the most rational 
institution in capitalist societies: the law of supply & demand. Even violence is used 
rationally: to eliminate competition and carry out those offences that would support 
generating a profit (Schneider, 2017: 95). 
Rationality was behind each instance a privateer obtained a Letter of Marque for the sole 
purpose of preying upon and capturing ships with intent to steal its cargo and sell it for a profit. 
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Rationality is also deciding to pursue this course, even in wartime, and then justify the violence 
and intimidation involved as being done for reprisal for one’s economic loss, especially when 
those preyed upon were not personally responsible for his loss and suffered harm as a result of it. 
After all, the common foreign man had little to do with the imperialist ambition of European 
nations, and as Harold Horwood pointed out, a privateer’s victims considered him a pirate, or at 
least a criminal (2011: 18). 
19. Subculture norms/contempt for civil society: Yes 
Many OCG will pattern their learned behaviour based upon subcultural norms and values 
that are diametrically opposed to the conventions and rules of civil society (Schneider, 
2017, p. 95-96).  
Though the privateer’s commission was technically legal, rational, and justified when he 
sailed under a Letter of Marque, with the state having condoned the practice, his actions must be 
classified as being diametrically opposed to those rules and norms valued by society. The reason 
being is that there is evidence that his own countrymen did not agree with the nature of his 
business, calling it “legalized piracy” (Marsters, 2004, as cited in Kert, 1997: 3). Also, the 
privateer’s actions are undoubtably harmful, causing much suffering (Marsters, 2004, p. 12) and 
the people he perpetrated them against could be regarded as nothing less than victims (Horwood, 
2011, p. 18). Even the practice of press-ganging, though technically legal Horwood, 2011, p. 13), 
was perpetrated against one’s own countrymen, therefore the argument that any harm suffered 
was solely against the enemy of the state, does not reflect the reality. Finally, the Declaration of 
Paris abolished privateering in 1856 (Kert, 1997, p. 53) which says, to me, that if it was truly 
justified in the eyes of society, any society, then it would have continued on.  
  




20. Sophistication: Yes 
It is the level of sophistication that separates organized from unorganized crimes. It 
denotes a level of complexity in its operations that would not be used by a smaller, 
disorganized, or local street gang. The utilization of technology, extensive planning, a large 
number of people, and a wider area of distribution or business also imply a high level of 
sophistication (Schneider, 2017, p. 96-97). 
There was a high level of sophistication in outfitting and running a privateering vessel 
because it was a major endeavor usually only undertaken by “rich merchants” (Horwood, 2011, 
p. 18). It required extensive planning, a large amount of investment, including money, 
manpower, time, and skill, but providing an exact cost is difficult since the cost of “outfitting a 
privateer depended on how much time and money owners and backers were willing to invest” 
(Kert, 1997, p. 81). Specialized skills such as the ability to captain a ship, make war, and the 
complicated navigation involved in sailing long distances, finding a prize, and sailing home 
again required a level of sophistication that barred much of the general public, or even some 
trading merchants from participation in the business of privateering, especially with such a high 
bond required (Horwood, 2011, p. 164) that left no room for doubt that it was a complicated and 
“dicey” endeavor (Kert, 1997, as cited in Rediker, 1987: 61).  
 
21. Non-ideological: Yes 
“Organized crime syndicates are not motivated by political ideologies, religious dogma, or 
a desire for social change. Their goal is the accumulation of money and other material 
benefits” (Schneider, 2017, p. 98). 
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While one could argue that the politics of the issuing state or monarchy may have placed 
privateering activity under the umbrella of a distinct ideology, but it remains that the individual 
privateers and their crews were in business for purely economic reasons, and not religious or 
political ones. Of this, Marsters writes that privateering “was a way for European nations to 
increase their military strength in an economical fashion” (2004: 6), in other words it was “the 
merchant’s way of waging war” (Marsters, 2004, as cited in Kert, 1997: 80). 
22. Rules/regulations/code of conduct: Yes 
Control systems begin with a set of values that define what is expected in terms of personal 
and group behaviour. “Rules are a control mechanism that regulates relationships within 
the criminal group and between the criminal group and the outside world” (Schneider, 
2017, p. 98). Even though an OCG technically operates outside of legitimate business in 
society, they must still use some sort of governance to ensure they run in an efficient and 
profitable manner. 
No major undertaking that can be classified as having a high level of sophistication 
would be possible without being governed under some form of rules or regulations. In the case of 
a privateering vessel the major form of regulation it sailed under was the Letter of Marque.  
According to Appendix 1.3, the document set out exactly what the mission is, who this document 
and mission was issued to, what the name of the ship was, how many men were to be aboard, 
how many guns and what ammunition would be aboard. The ship’s owner was also required to 
put up a monetary bond before they could receive their Letter of Marque, which would be lost if 
the privateer broke any of the rules while he was out at sea. It also stated when the commission 
was to begin, who their target was (and was not), where they could sail in order to intercept that 
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target, and what parameters or borders they could work within. The document also stated what 
items or people were allowed to be included in that mandate for seizure.  
The Letter of Marque also served as an intelligence gathering mission in that it instructed 
the named privateer to keep a journal of his exploits. The journal was to document what prizes he 
took (the ship name), the nature of the cargo, the value as near as can be judged of that cargo, 
and the date and place each prize was taken. In addition to this the privateer was also instructed 
to judge the “situation, motion, and strength of the Americas” as well as any other intelligence he 
can obtain. He was to then inform the Secretary of the Lords of his account of the above, and if 
possible, keep in correspondence while he is away.   
Any rules and regulations aboard ship likely followed the much the same military 
hierarchy as a navy ship with the captain being the head, the first mate his second, but also 
“mariners, soldiers, gunners” (Horwood, 2011, p. 13) and those who kept the ship running 
smoothly in practical ways such as the cook or cabin boy (Kert, 1997, p. 91). 
23. Discipline: Yes 
 Like rules and regulations, discipline controls the misbehaviour of those employed by an 
OCG, and threat of it serves to prevent infractions. “Disciplinary action can include 
removal from the organization, demotion, physical beatings, and even death” (Schneider, 
2017, p. 100). 
Privateering in Atlantic Canada was not heavily regulated, and thus disciplined for 
infractions pertaining to his Letter of Marque, or commission, until 1615 when the first Court of 
Vice-Admiralty was set up at Trinity (Horwood, 2011, p. 13). Before that time, almost complete 
lawlessness prevailed, except for the position of “fishing admiral” (Conlin, 2009, p. 11), who 
was simply the first captain to arrive in Newfoundland for the fishing season. It was not an 
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official position that was administered by any government, but simply a way for all of the 
fishermen to settle minor disputes during the season and had nothing at all to do with actions of 
privateers. Vice-Admiralty courts were set up all over British North America during the 18th 
century (Kert, 1997, p. 51), likely following as the number of British colonies here grew.  
In later periods, the penalty for misbehaviour could be a fine, loss of the bond used to 
secure a Letter of Marque, loss of either the prize money from the captured cargo, or ship 
(Marsters, 2004, p. 6), and even imprisonment or death, such as in the examples of Sir Henry 
Manwayring and Sir Francis Drake. This is because the lines between privateering and piracy 
were so blurred that “a privateer might stray into piracy almost by accident” (Horwood, 2011, 
p.9).  
Aboard the ship disciplinary matters would for the most part be up to the captain, but 
most likely followed the much the same power structure as a navy ship, though there is evidence 
that, when it was meted out, privateers were subject to a “harsh discipline” (Conlin, 1998, p. 85).   
Conclusion 
The perpetuation of organized criminal groups is fascinating, as is their organizational 
capabilities. Attempting to understand its nature is what has inspired so many attempts to define 
it. That OCC have developed and amorphized should come as no surprise, for organization is 
what human societies do, therefore the fascination of it must lie in the mystery. Each OCG 
features unique patterns of organization as influenced by many factors. Albini writes that OC 
must be viewed “as a vast continuum allowing for freedom of analyzing and defining a given 
particular criminal group as an entity in itself possessing a variety of characteristics, as opposed 
to a rigid classification based upon certain specific attributes” (1971: 37-38). In using 
Schneider’s 23-Point Taxonomy of an Organized Criminal Conspiracy, the characteristics of the 
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privateer were able to be analyzed in depth, providing a comprehensive view of the nature of 
their activities in relation to the degree of criminality that they exhibit.  
The detailed historical record coupled with the 23-Point Taxonomy of an Organized 
Criminal Conspiracy was sufficient to analyze the business of privateering in a comprehensive 
manner that satisfies both definitions of organized crime (UN & Canadian), and the historical 
considerations. Therefore, it is this paper’s conclusion that it is possible to label the privateer as 
an organized criminal and the business of privateering as an organized criminal conspiracy due 
to the overwhelming evidence in the historical record that details all aspects of the business as 
well as law during the time period that privateers were active.  
This research was conducted with the intention of analyzing the legality or criminality of 
an often overlooked group: the privateers. Studying the privateer, and how his world view at the 
time was different from ours, and what we, from the modern era, can do with this information, is 
what matters to us today. Analyzing his evolution and eventual demise can inform our 
understanding of the evolution of organized crime, and perhaps serves to enrich our 
understanding of the ways in which the state apparatus can (and historically has) been 
manipulated and molded in times of pressure; reframing the social construct of crime and 
blurring the lines between security and criminality.  
It seems the further we get from the lived reality of the privateers, the more “romantic” 
(Conlin, 1998, p. 80) the history had become. Writers of Nova Scotia’s history, those 
contemporaries of living privateers, such as T.C. Haliburton “had almost nothing to say about the 
colony’s private war at sea” (Sutherland, 2005) though he had served in the legislature with two 
of them (2005). Writing in 1867 another author, Beamish Murdoch, also neglected to mention 
the privateers in his historical account, and to this Sutherland speculates that the reason might 
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have something to do with the fact that Enos Collins, who lived until 1871, became a 
controversial figure (2005) due to his political views. The reason might have been less 
complicated, as Collins himself, when asked about his privateering days, would reply “You will 
observe, sir, that there were many things happened we don't care to talk about” (Sutherland, 
2005). It seems as though talk about those times and, more importantly, what happened during 
that time was considered unseemly. Furthermore, it seems the farther from that day we find 
ourselves, the more the subjected is treated with “romance” (Conlin, 1998, p. 80) and nostalgia.  
Taken together, Conlin and Kert reveal that many familiar assumptions about the who, 
why, and so-what aspects of Nova Scotian privateering need to be reassessed (Sutherland, 2005), 
and the one area that has not been explored in depth is the how the social history of privateering 
developed and may have influenced the public perception of the legality of privateering. There 
was neither the time, nor the space to examine that subject here, though there is a lot of material 
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RCMP 19-Point Criminal Organization Threat Assessment Attributes 
 
Corruption Discipline Monopoly 
Violence  Insulation Group Cohesion 
Infiltration Intelligence Gathering Continuity 
Expertise Multiple Enterprises Links to other Crime 
Groups  
Sophistication Mobility  
Subversion Stability Links to Criminal 
Extremist Groups  



















European Union (2001) 
To be defined as a criminal organization, a conspiracy must exhibit at least six 
of the following characteristics (# 1,3,5 & 11 are mandatory): 
1. Collaboration of more than two people,  
2. Each with own appointed tasks, 
3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time (refers to the stability & 
(potential) durability),  
4. Using some form of discipline & control,  
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences,  
6. Operating at an international level,  
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation,  
8. Using commercial or businesslike structures,  
9. Engaged in money laundering,  
10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
authorities or the economy, &  












A blank Letter of Marque  
 
BY HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Sir JOHN SHERBROOKE,  
 
Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant-Governor, and Commander in Chief, in and 
over His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia, and its Dependencies, vice Admiral of the same, &c; &c;  
 
To The Worshipful and Honourable ALEXANDER CROKE, L.L.D Judge and Commissionary of His Majesty's 
Court of Vice Admiralty for the Province &c; &c; &c;  
 
Whereas, by His Majesty's Commission under the Great Seal of Great Britain bearing Date the 13th Day 
of October in the year of Our Lord 1812, and in the 52d Year of His Majesty's Reign, the Lords 
Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral are required and authorized to issue forth 
and grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal to any of His Majesty's Subjects or others, whom we shall 
deem fitly qualified in that Behalf for apprehending, seizing, and taking the Ships, Vessels and Goods 
belonging to the United States of America, or to any Persons being Subjects of the United States of 
America (save and except for any Ships to which license has been granted) and to bring the same to 
Judgement in any of His Majesty's Courts of Admiralty with his Dominions, for Proceedings and 
Adjudication and Condemnation to be thereupon had, according to the Court of Admiralty, and the Laws 
of Nations;  
 
These are, therefore, to will and require you to cause a Letter of Marque and Reprisals to be issued out 
of the High Court of Admiralty unto ____________________________ Commander of the ship 
______________________ mounted with ____ Carriage Guns carrying Shot of ___ Pounds Weight and 
navigated with _______ men, to apprehend, seize, and take the Ships, Vessels and Goods Belonging to 
the United States of America, or to any persons being Subjects of France, according to His Majesty's 
Commission and Instruction aforesaid. And you are to keep an exact Journal of Proceedings, and therein 
particularly to take notice of all Prizes taken, the nature of such Prizes, the Time and Place of their being 
taken, the value of them as near as you can judge, as also the Situation, Motion and Strength of the 
Americans, as well as you can discover by the best Intelligence you can get; of which you shall from Time 
to Time as you shall have opportunity, to transmit an Account to our Secretary. Provide always that 
security be given according to His Majesty's Instructions before mentioned; the Said Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal to continue in force until further orders, for which this shall be your Warrant.  
Given under my Hand, and the Great Seal of the Province this ____ day of _____________ 18 __ in the 
_______ year of His Majesty's Reign.  
 
 
By His Excellency's Command.  
 
Secretary to His Excellency 
 




















Year Kings and Queens  Time Wars   
Privateering 
Eras   
  House of Tudor         
1500 Henry VII 1445 -1509 War of the League       
     of Cambrai 1512 - 1514     
     
       
  Henry VIII  1509 -1547 Italian Wars 1522 - 1559     
     Spanish Wars 1492 - 1571     
  Edward VI  1547 - 1553        
1550 Jane Grey  1553 - 1553        
  Mary I    1553 - 1558 English Sea Dogs 1545 - 1580     
  Elizabeth I  1558 - 1603 Eighty Year War 1566 - 1648     
            
     Nine Year War 1594 - 1603     
     
       
1600    Dutch - Portuguese War 1602 - 1661     
  House of Stuart  
       
  James I 1603 - 1625 Anglo French War 1927 - 1629     
  Charles I  1625 - 1649 1st Dutch War 1623 - 1653     
  Interregnum  Anglo Spanish 1625 - 1630     
  Oliver Cromwell 1649 - 1658        
1650 
Richard 
Cromwell 1658 - 1660 
 
      
     
       
  House of Stuart  
       
  Charles II 1660 - 1685 2nd Dutch War 1665 -1673     
  James II 1685 - 1688 3rd Anglo Dutch   
Port Royal 
Privateers 1690 - 1710 
  William III 1689 - 1702 Wars Against Louis XIV 1698 - 1713 
Mi'kmaq 
Privateers 1690 - 1760 
1700 Mary II 1689 - 1694        




War Against France & 
Spain 1739 - 1748     
  George I 1714 - 1727        
     
       
  George II 1727 - 1760 King George's War 1744 - 1748 
Louisburg 
Privateers 1743 - 1758 




Privateers  1755 - 1763 
     Pitts Imperial War 1756 - 1763     
     
       
     
       
  George III 1760 - 1820 American Revolution 1775 - 1783     
     Napoleonic Wars 1793 - 1812     
1800    Anglo French War 1803 - 1814     
     War of 1812 1812 - 1815     
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